Residents of Kandahar report that several members of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have been moved to various areas in the province along with their families. These locations include Karizgi, Kata Sang, Tanaucha, Qasim Kali, and Surkh Bid in the Shah Wali Kot district, situated over 100 kilometers from the Pakistani border.
Sources reveal that entry into these villages is restricted for locals, but large vehicles are frequently seen transporting construction materials. Local inhabitants confirm the presence of non-residents living in these areas with their families.
The behavior, attire, and language of these newcomers differ significantly from those of the indigenous population. A local elder from Shah Wali Kot shared, “These individuals have been here for a while. They keep to themselves, avoid interaction, and have distinct appearances, including long hair and unique accents.”
Drivers on the Kandahar-Uruzgan highway have also reported encounters with armed individuals. Azizullah, a driver on the route, stated, “These unidentified men block the road with chains every week or two, demanding money from travelers.” He added that these fighters are closely monitoring vehicles and people.
Since the Afghan Taliban regained power in August 2021, Pakistani militants have resurfaced in regions that were previously conflict zones. Afghan Taliban leaders and fighters, who sought refuge in Pakistan’s tribal areas during the war, have returned, bringing along their “former and current guests” from Pakistan.
While militants allied with the Haqqani Network in Paktia consider Khost, Paktia, and Paktika safe havens, those involved in major battles in Kandahar have settled sporadically across the province. These militants are now clashing with Pakistani security forces and launching deadly attacks in the country.
Khalid Pashtoon, a former Kandahar MP, revealed that TTP members and their commanders reside with their families in Shah Wali Kot and Nish District. “These militants were relocated beyond the Durand Line under Pakistan’s pressure,” he explained. The area serves as an ideal hideout, with TTP fighters safeguarding their families while younger members join battles along the Durand Line with support from the Afghan Taliban.
In May 2022, Pakistan urged the Taliban to remove Pakistani militants from the border. Islamabad even sent Chinese diplomats to Kandahar to discuss the issue with Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada. The Taliban proposed two areas in Afghanistan for these fighters—one in the north and another in the south.
The Haqqani group attempted to move Pakistani militants and their families to northern Afghanistan near the Qosh Tapa Canal, but local opposition thwarted the plan. Consequently, the Taliban settled them in Shah Wali Kot, a strategic location with access to multiple provinces, including Zabul, Uruzgan, Helmand, Daikundi, and Ghazni.
Initially, Pakistan did not view these shelters as problematic. However, with TTP’s increasing activities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, coupled with Baloch militants acquiring advanced weapons, Islamabad has recognized the region’s sensitivity.
In late December 2024, Pakistan’s former special representative for Afghanistan indirectly confirmed that TTP hideouts are located in Kandahar.
The bond between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, forged through shared religious beliefs, family ties, and historical connections, remains strong. Sources indicate that the two groups have a pre-Kabul agreement called “Mir Ali,” signed in North Waziristan. Under this pact, the Afghan Taliban pledged to support the Pakistani Taliban in establishing an Islamic system in Pakistan.
Khalid Pashtoon noted, “The Afghan Taliban’s assistance to the TTP stems from mutual commitments made during the 20-year war in Afghanistan.” He added that the bodies of Afghan Taliban fighters killed in clashes with Pakistani forces have been returned to their families in southern provinces and even Farah and Badghis.
Gen. Sami Sadat, a former army commander, stated, “The Afghan Taliban are providing military and financial aid to the TTP. Some even join the TTP and die in battles.”
The Afghan Taliban now face a dilemma. They rely on Pakistan’s support, as many of their leaders and families remain in Pakistan. However, Islamabad’s demands to curb TTP activities in Afghanistan put the Taliban in a difficult position.
Cracking down on the TTP could alienate a key ally and create internal discord. Additionally, the Taliban’s support for the TTP contradicts their commitment under the 2020 Doha Agreement, where they vowed not to allow Afghan soil to be used for attacks on other countries.
Analysts warn that failing to balance relations with militants and international expectations could have severe consequences for the Taliban. Pakistan’s recent accusations of the Taliban colluding with India have further strained ties.
If insurgent attacks spread beyond Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan might resort to its old strategy of supporting Afghan insurgents against the central government. Distrust between the two allies is growing, with the Taliban suspecting Islamabad of backing ISIS and anti-Pakistan sentiment rising among Taliban officials.
The situation remains tense as the Taliban navigate complex regional dynamics while trying to maintain their grip on power.
