TTP Chief Noor Wali Mehsud Linked to Islamabad Blast: Information Minister Reveals Full Network

Information Minister Attaullah Tarar has revealed that the November 11 suicide att@ck outside Islamabad’s Judicial Complex was planned by the banned TTP’s chief, Noor Wali Mehsud. While addressing a press conference in Islamabad, he said the entire operation was orchestrated from inside Afghanistan. He added that the network behind the att@ck has now been uncovered, with four key facilitators arrested within 48 hours.

The suicide blast, which claimed 12 lives and injured 35 others, was carried out by an Afghan national identified as Usman Shinwari. Tarar stated that detailed evidence links the planning, training, and facilitation of this incident to TTP commanders operating across the border. Because of this link, he stressed that the country escaped a “major loss,” as the group originally planned to target either Islamabad or Rawalpindi.

Planning Conducted Across the Border

Tarar explained that the att@ck was planned by Noor Wali Mehsud through his commander, Daadullah. He said Sajidullah alias “Sheena,” the bomber’s primary handler, met Daadullah in 2023, 2024, and again in August 2025. Their communication continued through an encrypted app. According to the minister, Daadullah is a resident of Bajaur but currently remains inside Afghanistan, where he coordinated the mission.

The information minister played a recorded statement from Sajidullah during the press briefing. In the video, Sajidullah confessed to arranging the suicide jacket and bringing the bomber to the site. He said he joined TTP in 2015 and later received training at several TTP camps across Afghanistan. Moreover, his visits to Jalalabad and Kunar helped solidify his connection with TTP commanders, including Abu Hamza and Daadullah.

Operational Details and Movement of the Facilitators

The network consisted of four main facilitators: Sajidullah, Kamran Khan, Muhammad Zali, and Shah Munir. According to Tarar, the group helped move the bomber, arranged his shelter, and stored the explosive jacket before the att@ck. Their activities included renting rooms, shifting locations repeatedly, and scouting possible targets. Despite these efforts, heightened secu-rity in Islamabad prevented them from reaching the original target.

Tarar outlined how the facilitators picked up the jacket from a graveyard in Peshawar and later handed it to Munir for safekeeping. When the bomber arrived from Afghanistan, the group hosted him in private homes and later arranged rented accommodation. On November 11, the day of the att@ck, the three men helped Shinwari wear the explosive jacket before transporting him to the Judicial Complex.

Clear Evidence of Cross-Border Planning

According to the information minister, the evidence presented by the government proves coordinated involvement between the TTP and TTA elements across the border. He said the bomber, his handler, and the planners all had strong connections to Afghan-based networks. He added that the att@ck was “clearly orchestrated from Afghanistan,” making the cross-border threat more visible and concerning.

Tarar stated that the CTD and Intelligence Bureau tracked and arrested the facilitators within 48 hours, calling the operation a major achievement. He stressed that these arrests exposed a “huge racket,” further showing that the operation was part of a broader network working to destabilize Pakistan.

Timeline of Training and Radicalisation

In his video confession, Sajidullah shared his journey with the TTP. He said he first went to Afghanistan in 2016, where Abu Hamza trained him. During his 2023 visit to Kunar, he reconnected with senior commanders and was later taken to Daadullah’s hideout. There, he claimed he was forced to take an oath of allegiance and tasked with upcoming missions.

Six months ago, he and Zali were summoned to Afghanistan again. They stayed in Shigal district before meeting Abu Hamza and later Daadullah in Kabul. According to Tarar, these meetings show the detailed planning behind the suicide bombing.

Pakistan’s secu-rity Forces Remain Fully Active

Tarar praised the performance of the CTD, IB, and Pakistan’s armed forces. He said they remain fully active in eliminating terr0r threats. According to him, the swift arrests and rapid intelligence work prevented further att@cks.

He emphasized that the Islamabad incident proves a renewed effort by Afghan-based militants to target major cities. Therefore, Pakistan’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies remain on high alert, and coordinated action will continue.

Conclusion

The information minister’s detailed briefing revealed a sophisticated TTP network operating between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Because the entire plot involved cross-border planning, communication, and training, the incident has once again highlighted the persistent threat from Afghan-based terr0r outfits. With the arrests made and evidence presented, Pakistan’s secu-rity agencies say they remain determined to prevent similar incidents in the future.